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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE RULE*
INTRODUCTION

Franchising in the United States is a growing business activity, "probably the only form of business entity that, by its very
nature, contributes to the creation of new business units."' It
was estimated that franchising would account for thirty-one percent of retail sales in 1979.2 Total sales by franchised businesses
were $116 billion in 1969;3 by 1979 total sales had grown to almost
4
$300 billion.
In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began an investigation into practices used in the sale of prospective
franchise schemes. 5 The FTC's investigation was prompted by
its determination that "the general nature of the 'franchise relationship' results in a serious informational imbalance between
prospective franchisees and their franchisors. ' 6 On December
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. John R.F.

Baer.
1.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1 (Jan.,

1979) [hereinafter cited as FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY].

Franchising is one of the hottest segments of the U.S. economy.
Well-heralded rags to riches stories have come out of this particular
way of marketing in which a parent company relies on a network of
outlets owned by small business operators to sell its brand of products
or services.
CHANGING TIMES 21 (July, 1979).
2. FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 12 chart 3.

3. Id. at 35, table 4.
4. Id. at 34, table 3.
5. See generally Hearings on Review of Federal Trade Comm'n
Franchise Disclosure Rule before the Senate Comm. on Small Business
(July 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing] (Opening Statement
of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Chairman).
6. Brief of Federal Trade Comm'n at 6, Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, No. 79-7076 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as FTC Opposition
Motion] (Opposition to Emergency Motion for a Stay of the Effective Date
of the Franchise Disclosure Rule) (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 59,697, 59,699 (1978))
(Petitioners include Shell Oil Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Union Oil Co. of
California, Exxon Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Standard
Oil Co. (Indiana), Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Chevron Chemical Co., Gulf Oil
Corp., Getty Refining and Marketing Co., and Kerr-McGee Refining Corp.;
Ashland Oil is an intervenor).
"The record demonstrates that many franchisors, (sic) find it in their
interest to misrepresent or not fully disclose material information needed
by the prospective franchisee." Id. at 7 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 59,699 (1978)).
Many investors in franchises have indeed succeeded beyond their
wildest dreams. Many more have done well, though not without invest-
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21, 1978, 7 the investigation resulted in promulgation of a final
trade regulation rule which was originally scheduled to become
effective on July 21, 1979, but was postponed until October 21,
1979. The Rule, "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures," 8
has the force and effect of law.9 Claiming to have discovered
"widespread consumer injury due to lack of information and
misrepresentations in the sale of franchises,"'1 the FTC took the
position that "[tjhe evidence of abuses contained in the
[rulemaking] record documents the need for protection of prospective franchisees"" through the use of an appropriate disclosure document prior to the inception of the franchise
relationship.
Franchising
The franchise system provides unique advantages to both
franchisor and franchiSee.' 2 It is a means by which the
franchisor "can expand into the distribution function, while
avoiding the large-scale capital requirements demanded by the
more traditional techniques of expansion such as the integrated
ing a hefty amount of time and hard work in addition to dollars. But for
another group of investors, the dream has proved to be a nightmare.
Some have seen their businesses collapse because the franchise
company was poorly run. Some gambled on a franchised product or
service that simply failed to appeal to customers. Others have met
financial ruin in deals concocted by swindlers who used the alluring
word franchise to rope them into rip-off schemes.
CHANGING TIMES 21 (July, 1979).
7. "The Commission first proposed a franchise rule on November 11,
1971. Public hearings were conducted in 1972. On August 22, 1974, a revised
proposed rule was published. Comments on the revised proposed rule were
accepted until November 20, 1974, on which date the Commission contends
the public record was closed." Brief of Schwinn Bicycle Co. at 13, Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 79-7172 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Schwinn Brief I (Memorandum of Law in Support of Schwinn
Bicycle Co.'s Emergency Motion for a Stay of the Effective Date of the
Trade Regulation Rule on Franchising Pending Judicial Review) (footnotes
omitted).
Along with the Rule (43 Fed. Reg. 59,614-59,621) the Commission also
published a Statement of Basis and Purpose (43 Fed. Reg. 59,621-59,733) and
Proposed Guides (43 Fed. Reg. 59,733-59,753). On July 25, 1979, the Commission released revised Guides, 44 Fed. Reg. 49,965 (1979).
8. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 et seq. (1979) [hereinafter referred to as the Rule].
9. Senate Hearing,supra note 5 (Opening Statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Chairman, at 2).
10. Federal Trade Comm'n News Release (Dec. 21, 1978) at 1 [hereinafter cited as FTC NewsI.
11. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 19.
12. Caine, Termination of Franchise Agreements: Some Remedies for
Franchiseesunder the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 CuM.-SAm. L. REV. 347,
348 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Caine].
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chain ....,,13 At the same time, the system "provides the opportunity for a [franchisee] with little capital and little or no experience to operate his own business with a reasonable chance of
success."' 14 It gives a franchisee a competitive advantage over
other small business entrepreneurs, 15 because a franchisee may
have the use of trade names, marketing expertise, financial
assistance, a distinctive business format, standardization of
products and services, advertising, and training from the parent
16
organization.
Franchising involves distribution of goods or services
through selected outlets. 17 The definition of "franchise" which
the FTC chose to use in the Rule is a list of characteristics which
can make a continuing commercial relationship into a
franchise. 18 The FTC's definition covers both product and pack13. Id. (citing Professor Jerome Shuman, "[f] ranchising is the natural
outgrowth of technological evolution").
14. Id.
15. FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 1.

16. Id.
17. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,965 (1979).
18. (a) The term "franchise" means any continuing commercial relationship created by any arrangement or arrangements whereby:
(1)(i)(A) a person (hereinafter "franchisee") offers, sells, or distributes to any person other than a "franchisor". .. goods, commodities, or services which are:
(1) Identified by a trademark, service mark, trade name, advertising or other commercial symbol designating another person (hereinafter "franchisor"); or
(2) Indirectly or directly required or advised to meet the quality
standards prescribed by another person (hereinafter "franchisor")
where the franchisee operates under a name using the trademark, service mark, trade name, advertising or other commercial symbol designating the franchisor; and
(B) (1) The franchisor exerts or has authority to exert a significant
degree of control over the franchisee's method of operation, including,
but not limited to, the franchisee's business organization, promotional
activities, management, marketing plan or business affairs; or
(2) The franchisor gives significant assistance to the franchisee in
the latter's method of operation, including, but not limited to, the franchisee's business organization, management, marketing plan, promotional activities, or business affairs; Provided,however, That assistance
in the franchisee's promotional activities shall not, in the absence of
assistance in other areas of the franchisee's method of operation, constitute significant assistance; or
(ii) (A) A person (hereinafter "franchisee") offers, sells, or distributes to any person other than a "franchisor"... goods, commodities, or
services which are:
(1) Supplied by another person (hereinafter "franchisor"), or
(2) Supplied by a third person . .. with whom the franchisee is
directly or indirectly required to do business by another person (hereinafter "franchisor"); or
(3) Supplied by a third person ... with whom the franchisee is
directly or indirectly advised to do business by another person (herein-
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age franchises, as well as business opportunity schemes, in the
same regulation. 19 It is unique, and differs from pre-existing
state franchising statutes, which emphasize as elements a continuing commercial relationship, granting of the franchisor's
property rights to the franchisee, and "retention of control by
the franchisor
over the franchisee in the conduct of the busi20
ness."

The FTC's definition of "franchise" in its consumer bulletin
"Franchise Business Risks" 2 1 is more succinct and understandable: "A system used by a company ...

which grants to others

...the right and license to market a product or service and engage in a business developed by it under franchisor's trade
names, trademarks, service marks, know-how and method of do'22
ing business.
Because franchising is a method of distribution, not an industry, 23 the basic difficulty in attempting to regulate franchising is the problem of defining a franchise in such a way that all
after "franchisor") where such third person is affiliated with the
franchisor; and
(B) The franchisor:
(1) Secures for the franchisee retail outlets or accounts for said
goods, commodities, or services; or
(2) Secures for the franchisee locations or sites for vending machines, rack displays, or any other product sales display used by the
franchisee in the offering, sale, or distribution of said goods, commodities, or services; or
(3) Provides to the franchisee the services of a person able to secure the retail outlets, accounts, sites or locations referred to in paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B)(1) and (2) above; and
(2) The franchisee is required as a condition of obtaining or commencing the franchise operation to make a payment or a commitment
to pay to the franchisor, or to a person affiliated with the franchisor.

16 C.F.R. § 436.2.
The first alternative definition [ (a) (1) (i) (A) and (B) ] covers so-called
product and package franchises. The second alternative definition
[ (a) (1) (ii) (A) and (B) ] covers so-called business opportunity schemes.

The last element I(a) (2) 1 applies to both types of franchise.
19. Id.

20. Comment, Franchises: Compelling Full Disclosure in Franchise
Agreements, 5 CuM.-SAm. L. REV. 501, 502 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CUMBERLAND-SAMFORDI (referring to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-801 (a) (Supp. 1973) &
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133e(b) (West 1973)).

21.

FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, FRANCHISE

Bulletin No. 4 [hereinafter cited as

BUSINESS RISKS,

Consumer

BUSINESS RISKS].

22. Id.
23. See generally FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6; Letter of

Charles W.Walton, Vice President-General Counsel and Secretary of Koehring Co. to FTC (Feb. 13, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Koehring comment]
(submitted pursuant to FTC request for comments concerning Proposed
Guides); Letter from Irene E. Bialas on behalf of Rexnord, Inc. to FTC (Feb.

16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Rexnord comment];
ECONOMY, supra note 1.

FRANCHISING IN THE
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genuine franchises are regulated without burdening similar
nonfranchise business forms. 24 "The franchise relationship has
characteristics associated with the legal relationships of agency,
employment, and independent contracting. Yet because it fits
so badly into any of these traditional classifications, franchising
''25
has generally been considered sui generis.
The traditional types of franchising, known as product and
trade name franchising, consist of product distribution arrangements in which the franchisee is identified with the manufacturer's supplies. Typical of this type are automobile dealerships
and soft drink bottlers. Business format franchising is a newer
type of franchising in which a franchisor "establishes a fully integrated relationship that includes not only product, service,
and trademark but also a marketing strategy and plan, operating
manuals and standards, quality control, and a communications
system that provides for information feed-forward and feedback .... -26 Examples of this form of business are fast food
restaurants, many types of non-food retailing, lodging, personal
27
and business services, and real estate services.
24. Fern, The OverbroadScope of FranchiseRegulation.- A Definitional
Dilemma, 34 Bus. LAw. 1387, 1388 (Apr., 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fern I.
25. 59 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1975) (referring to D. Thompson,
FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST, 6 (1971)).
26. FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 3.

27.
RANKING OF KINDS OF FRANCHISING BY SALES: 1977
Kinds of Franchised Business
TOTAL - ALL FRANCHISING
Automobile and Truck Dealers
Gasoline Service Stations
Fast Food Restaurants (All Types)
Retailing (Non-Food)
Soft Drink Bottlers
Automotive Products and Services
Hotels and Motels
Convenience Stores
Business Aids and Services
Retailing (Food Other Than
Convenience Stores)
Rental Services (Auto-Truck)
Construction, Home Improvement,
Maintenance and Cleaning Services
Recreation, Entertainment and Travel
Educational Products and Services
Laundry and Drycleaning Services
Rental Services (Equipment)
Campgrounds
Miscellaneous
FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY,

Sales
($000)

Number of
Establishments

253,374,669
132,041,000
56,538,000
18,180,404
10,329,838
9,046,000
6,515,321
5,148,863
4,319,743
3,388,914

450,800
31,680
176,450
51,972
41,760
2,146
48,718
5,186
14,144
32,227

3,231,446
2,105,809

13,299
6,888

1,090,737
239,644
233,440
229,237
192,219
108,892
435,162

13,093
4,242
1,878
2,769
1,421
1,057
1,870

supra note 1, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
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Beginning in the 1950's, franchising, an old idea with limited
application, caught on and expanded rapidly in many directions. 28 Along with reputable businessmen, this rapid growth

has attracted many unprincipled operators who try to take advantage of anyone they can. 29 In 1971, California became the

first state to enact a franchise disclosure law 30 to control entrepreneurs of dubious integrity and promoters of under-capital32
ized ventures. 3 1 In 1978, the California Commissioner
33
advocated the need for a stricter disclosure law:

[Mjany prospective franchisees, enamored with [sic] the idea of
running their own business(es), may not be capable of recognizing
the long range onerous effects of certain contractual terms. Even if
a prospect has the ability to recognize such terms, he is usually
powerless to modify the agreement. The inferior bargaining position of the prospective franchisee generally leaves no meaningful
choice other than to accept the agreement as drafted by the
franchisor or forego the investment.wM
After the franchise relationship has begun, the franchisee
may experience other problems. If he quits a losing business,
"he not only loses his investment, but also is barred from the
business by the covenant not to compete. ' 35 Furthermore, litigation is often painfully slow, and franchising has grown so
quickly that a corresponding body of case law has not yet devel36
oped.
28. Id. at 20.
29. BUSINESS

RISKS,

supra note 21.

30. To date, fourteen states have enacted franchise disclosure laws
adopting the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC). The UFOC is a
system of uniform compliance procedures established by the International
Franchise Association (IFA)-the trade association of franchisors. The IFA
was formed in 1960 to serve as an advocate for the franchise method of doing business. Membership today has grown to encompass nearly 380
franchising companies who are engaged in business in three dozen different
industries. See note 130 infra.
31. "Fraud isn't the only thing to worry about in scouting for a franchise
business investment. Money can be lost just as surely in a venture that is
not financially sound." CHANGING TIMES, supra note 1, at 22.
32. The Commissioner heads the California Department of Corporations, the agency that administers the California Investment Law.
33. "This new form of regulation is derived from state securities ("blue
sky") laws and is commonly referred to as the 'fair, just and equitable' test
or standard. It would extend significantly the reach of a state's regulatory
arm into the substantive provisions of the franchise agreement." FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 21.
34. Id. at 22-23.
35. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING REALITIES AND REMEDIES 158 (1978) [hereinafter cited as H. BROWN].
36. Id.

FTC Franchise Disclosure Rule
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The Rule's Definition of Franchisor
There are three elements in the FTC's definition, all of
which must be present to have a "franchise." First, the FTC defines the franchisor as the member of the business relationship
who provides goods or services for distribution, which are identified with him by a trademark, service mark, or other commercial symbol,37 or8 who prescribes quality standards to be met by
3
the franchisee.
"[Tihe distinguishing characteristic of franchising is that
the manufacturer's trademark is used to such an extent that
there is commonality of identity between the manufacturer and
the dealer. '39 It has been suggested that this commonality has
been used "to deceive the potential customer of the franchisee
as to the identity of the person with whom he is dealing. '40 A
more moderate view of the characteristic use of the franchisor's
trademark is that it makes the franchisees' businesses appear to
41
be part of an integrated chain.
Second, the franchisor must exert a "significant degree of
control over" 42 or give "significant assistance" 43 in the franchisee's method of doing business. "Control is a vital ingredient
of successful franchising" because the entire franchise system
37.
38.
39.
40.

16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(1)(i)(A)(1) (1979).
Id. § 436.2(a)(1) (i) (A) (2).
Koehring comment, supra note 23.
Rockefeller, Franchisingand Antitrust Laws, 56

CHI.

B. REC. 44, 45

(July-Aug. 1974). The author offers in support of his theory the example of
McDonald's:
[One sees signs at McDonald's drive-ins claiming so many billion hamburgers sold. The notion conveyed to the potential customer is that

here is a location at which he can buy a hamburger from a thrifty
Scotchman who started a single hamburger stand and built it into an
empire of 2,500 locations at which billions have been sold, when the

truth is that the seller at that location is not named McDonald and is
not even named Kroc and never sold that many hamburgers .... Thus

is [sic] seems the principle objective of "franchising," in defining the

term, is consumer deception. There is also a secondary purpose in

every franchise relationship, as many use the term, and that is to restrain trade and eliminate competition between franchisees.

Id.
41. Comment, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws. An Overview, 41
535 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TENN. L. REV.].

TENN. L. REV.

42. 16 C.F.R. §436.2(a)(1)(i)(B)(1) (1979).
43. Id. § 436.2(a)(1) (i) (B) (2).

44. The essence of any franchise system is the establishment of
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is dependent upon the goodwill of the franchisor's trademark. If
one franchisee is permitted to vary from uniform procedures
the public image of the entire system is
and quality standards,
''45
jeopardized.
With regard to business opportunity ventures, 46 if he does
not provide significant control or assistance, the franchisor may
supply the goods or services to the franchisee, 47 or require him
to do business with another supplier.48 Furthermore, the
49
franchisor secures for the franchisee retail outlets or accounts,
50
or locations for sales display.
Finally, the franchisor requires a payment as a condition for
granting the franchise operation. 5 1 The definition of "franchise
fee" has been a major issue in disputes over the scope of the
Rule.

52

The FTC's Rulemaking Authority
In 1914, the Wilson Administration's plan for a trade commission was introduced in Congress. 5 3 The Covington bill debates included arguments that the new commission should be
given only adjudicatory powers, and that it should have a combi54
nation of adjudicatory and substantive rulemaking powers.
Because the enacting law and legislative history were not clear,
it was not known whether this language gave the Federal Trade
quasi-independent businessmen subject to various controls respecting
their business operations, the nature of which depends in part on the

philosophy of the franchisor and on the nature of the products and serv-

ices franchised. However, some form of control over the franchisee is
an essential ingredient of the franchise system.
15 Business Organizations, Glickman, FRANCHISING, § 201 n. 5 (quoting Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising submitted to the FTC by its staff
on June 2, 1969 and announced by the FTC on Dec. 10, 1969, in turn quoting
FTC Memorandum to SBA 4 (Mar. 10, 1966)).
45. TENN. L. REV., supra note 41, at 536 n. 5 (referring to Garlick, Pure
Franchising,Control and the Antitrust Laws: Friendsor Foes? 48 J. URB. L.
835, 839-42 (1971)).
46. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
47. 16 C.F.R. §436.2(a)(1)(ii)(A)(1) (1979).
48. Id. § 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(A)(2).
49. Id. § 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(B)(1).
50. Id. § 436.2(a)(1)(ii)(B)(2).
51. Id.§ 436.2(a)(2).
52. See notes 125-38 and accompanying text infra.
53. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 app.

(D.C. Cir. 1973).

54. Id. at 700.
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Commission5 5 the power to make industry-wide regulatory
56
rules.
This uncertainty was addressed and finally resolved in 1973
by Judge Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in National PetroleumRefiners Association v. Federal
Trade Commission.57 The FTC Act as finally adopted on September 26, 1914 declares "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
to be unlawful. 58 At issue in National Petroleum was whether
the FTC could declare a practice unfair or deceptive through
rulemaking as well as through case-by-case adjudication. 59 The
court of appeals held that the FTC has authority to promulgate
60
trade regulation rules which have the effect of substantive law.
The court noted the "judicial trend favoring rulemaking over adjudication for development of new agency policy" 6 1 to support
its opinion. The court felt that "contemporary considerations of
practicality and fairness 62 support recognition of the Commis63
sion's authority to impose bright line standards of behavior."
Judge Wright was "confident that if Congress believes that its
creature, the Commission, thus exercises too much power, it will
'64
repeal the grant.
Far from repealing the grant of authority, Congress ratified
it65 in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis55. Federal Trade Commission, Promotion of Export Trade and Prevention of Unfair Methods of Competition, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1976).
56. "Our conclusion as to the scope of § 6(g) [the FTC rulemaking sec-

tion] is not disturbed by the fact that the agency itself did not assert the
power to promulgate substantive rules until 1962 and indeed indicated intermittently before that time that it lacked such power." National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The Commission first announced it would enforce the provisions of the
deceptive practices section of the FTC Act (§ 5), with the assistance of substantive rules, in 1962 when it amended its Rules of Practice to provide for
issuance of Trade Regulation Rules. 27 Fed. Reg. 4636, 4796 (1962).

57. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (at issue was the Commission's power to
promulgate a substantive rule declaring that failure to post octane ratings
on service station pumps was a deceptive practice).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).

59. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d at 686.
60. Id. at 698.
61. Id. at 683.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 697.
65. Senator Magnuson pointed out, "For years the argument has been
going on about the Federal Trade Commission not having the authority it
should have. We tried to fashion a bill. I, myself, had some doubts about
the rulemaking authority, but I think the bill covers it very well." 117 CONG.
REC. S.17,858 (1971).
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sion Improvement Act of 1975.66 Magnuson-Moss permits the
FTC to prescribe "interpretive rules and general statements ,of
policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce" 67 and "rules which define with specificity
-68
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive ....
Magnuson-Moss states that in prescribing a rule the Commission should follow section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),69 which states the procedures for informal
rulemaking by a federal agency. 70 In addition to the APA requirements, Magnuson-Moss mandates some trial-type features,
such as oral submissions, rebuttal testimony, and cross-exami71
nation.
Finally, Magnuson-Moss is a proscription of rulemaking
under any other authority.72 However, the amendments made
by Magnuson-Moss are not to apply to any rule promulgated
prior to Magnuson-Moss's enactment. Any proposed rule which
66. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 [hereinafter referred to as Magnuson-Moss].
67. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 Title II § 202(a) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (a)(1)(A)).
68. Id. § 202(a) (1) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a, § 18(a)-(1) (B)).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 553 provides in part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in
the Federal Register....
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
70. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 Title II § 202(a) (amending 15 U.S.C.

§ 57a, § 18(b)).
71.

When prescribing a rule under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this sec-

tion, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with section 553 of
title 5, United States Code . . . and shall also (1) publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking stating with particularity the reason for the proposed rule; (2) allow interested persons to submit written data, views,
and arguments, and make all such submissions publicly available; (3)
provide an opportunity for an informal hearing in accordance with subsection (c); and (4) promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule based on the
matter in the rulemaking record..., together with a statement of basis
and purpose.
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 Title § 202(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a,
§ 18(b)).
72. (2) The Commission shall have no authority under this Act, other
than its authority under this section, to prescribe any rule with respect
to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ....
The preceding sentence shall not affect any authority of the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpretive rules), and general statements of policy, with respect to unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce.
Id. § 2 0 2 (a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(2)).
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was substantially completed before that date is valid under
73
Magnuson-Moss's grandfather clause.
The FTC Act's declaration that "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" are unlawful 74 was the basis on which the FTC asserted jurisdiction to regulate franchising. "In the past, this
standard [was] employed primarily against deceptive advertising of products and services. Recently it has been evoked in
franchising situations, with particular emphasis on deceptive
'75
advertising in the sale of franchises.
Prior to the promulgation of the Rule, the FTC had received
complaints from franchisees "alleging a wide range of abuses associated with a variety of franchise and business opportunity offerings. '76 On a case-by-case basis, the Commission adjudicated
such complaints: a franchisor of drive-in restaurants was ordered to cease using exaggerated earning claims and deceptive
offers of training and advertising to promote the sale of its
franchises;7 7 a franchisor of personal improvement courses was
ordered to cease misrepresenting that its products would be
easy to sell. 78 While each complaint was thus resolved, "the
Commission's individual case-by-case approach had not been
sufficient to curb the abuses it found within the industry. '79 The
goal of a bright line rule is solving this problem by "shortening
73.

(c) (1) The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) of this

section shall not affect the validity of any rule which was promulgated
under section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act prior to the
date of enactment of this section. Any proposed rule under section 6(g)
of such Act with respect to which presentation of data, views, and argu-

ments was substantially completed before such date may be promulgated in the same manner and with the same validity as such rule could
have been promulgated had this section not been enacted.
Id. § 202(c)(1) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 57a note).
74. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
75. H. BROWN, supra note 35, at 159.
76. Memo from Edward W. Colbert (Feb. 4, 1975) (intraoffice FTC memo
available from FTC by F.O.I.A. procedures).
77. In re Meal or Snack System, Inc., 75 F.T.C. 497 (1969).
78. In re Success Motivation Inst., Inc., 77 F.T.C. 943 (1970).
In In re Redi-Brew Corp., 83 F.T.C. 1346 (1974), the FTC ordered a
franchisor of vending machines to cease misrepresenting the quality of its
machines, its affiliation with the Coca-Cola Co., its services, and its business
activities.
In In re Consolidated Chemical Corp., 84 F.T.C. 479 (1974), the FTC ordered a franchisor of vending machines to cease misrepresenting the nature and security of its franchises or distributorships. The franchisor was
required to furnish a prospective franchisee with details of the franchise
operation in writing at the first contact, and allow a ten-day cooling-off period to cancel the contract with full refund rights.
Note that both of these cases concerned business opportunity ventures.
79. Goldberg, Federal Regulation of Franchises: The Federal Trade
Comm'n Rule, 59 CH. B. REC. 338 (May-June 1978).
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clarifying the

THE RULE 8 1

"The Franchise Rule was promulgated on December 21,

1978, pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking authority under
section 18 of the FTC Act, as amended by ... Magnuson-Moss
*"82 It became effective October 21, 1979.83 Revised Guides
....
for compliance with the Rule were approved by the Commission
on July 25, 1979.
"The Rule is designed to provide disclosure-not regulation
of the business." 84 According to the FTC, the Rule was promulgated because the Commission found "widespread" evidence of
deceptive and unfair practices in connection with the sale of
franchises. 85 The intended benefit of the Rule is "to furnish prospective franchisees with essential and reliable information
about the franchisor, the franchise business and the terms of the
franchise agreement. These benefits will be accomplished by
means of a disclosure statement containing the information necessary to make an informed investment decision" 8 6 which will

80. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir.

1973) (quoting Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921, 962 (1965)).

81. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
82. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 5. The FTC further stated
that "[t] he Rule serves the public interest by preventing both material misrepresentation and nondisclosure of material facts in connection with the
marketing of franchises."
83. The Rule was originally scheduled to become effective July 21, 1979.
84. Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (Opening Statement of Senator

Nelson).
85. Id. (Statement of Albert H. Kramer, Director, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, FTC).
The Commission's Statement of Basis and Purpose accompanying the
rule identifies certain factors which have often been present in the sale
of those businesses and which have helped to create conditions under
which consumer abuses occur. Among the major factors have been:

1. A serious informational imbalance between the franchisor and
the prospective franchisee, which has meant that the franchisee often
is unaware of relevant and essential facts germane to the proposed investment;
2. The prospective franchisee's relative lack of business sophisti-

cation;
3. The complexity of the proposed franchise agreements; and
4. The lack of adequate review time for franchisees prior to the
establishment of a franchise relationship.
Id. at 1-2.
86. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 25.
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decrease the "potential for misrepresentation and unfairness
'87
which often accompanies a lack of information.
The Guides list as deceptive practices which violate the
Rule: failure to furnish the franchisee with the Basic Disclosure
Document;8 8 making representations about sales or profits in a
way other than as prescribed by the Rule; making claims inconsistent with the information required by the Rule; failure to furnish copies of the franchisor's standard franchise agreements;
and failure to return deposits. 89 "Violators are subject to civil
penalty actions brought by the Commission of up to $10,000 per
violation." 90
The franchisor is required to provide the prospective franchisee with the disclosure statement at their first meeting or ten
days before they enter a contract, whichever is earlier. 91 The
disclosure statement must have a cover sheet giving the name of
the franchisor and a statement warning the franchisee to read
the information provided. 92 The Basic Disclosure Document re-

87. Id.
88. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,971 (1979).
It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act for any franchisor or franchise
broker.
1. to fail to furnish prospective franchisees with the Basic Disclosure Document in the manner and within the time frames established
in the rule [§ 436.1(a)];
2. to make any representations about the actual or potential sales,
income, or profits of existing or prospective franchises except in the
manner and within the time frames established by the rule, including
dissemination of the Earnings Claim Document [§ 436.1 (b)-(e)];

3. to make any claim or representation (such as in advertising or
oral statements by sales-persons) which is inconsistent with the information required to be disclosed by the rule [§ 436.1(f) ];
4. to fail to furnish prospective franchisees, within the time
frames established by the rule, with copies of the franchisor's standard
forms of franchise agreements and copies of the final agreements to be
signed by the parties [§ 436.1(g)]; and
5. to fail to return to prospective franchisees any funds or deposits
(such as down payments) identified as refundable in the Basic Disclosure Document [§ 436.1(h) ].
90. Id.
91. "The term 'time for making of disclosures' means ten (10) business days prior to (1) the execution by the franchisee of any franchise
agreement . . .or (2) the payment by a prospective franchisee about
which the franchisor. . . knows or should know, of any consideration in
connection with the sale or proposed sale of a franchise."
16 C.F.R. § 436.2(g).
92. To protect you, we've required your franchisor to give you this
information. We haven't checked it, and don't know if it's correct. It
should help you make up your mind. Study it carefully. While it includes some information about your contract, don't rely on it alone to
understand your contract. Read all of your contract carefully. Buying a
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quires that the prospective franchisee be provided with twenty
categories of information about the franchisor and his busi93
ness.
Rationale of the Rule
The Rule "is designed to provide prospective investors with
information which the FTC believes is necessary to make an
informed investment decision. 9 4 Since the abuses to which the
Rule is addressed stem from the nature of the franchise relationship, the FTC feels that a general regulation for all types of
franchises is therefore justified.95 Not surprisingly, franchisors
franchise is a complicated investment. Take your time to decide. If
possible, show your contract and this information to an advisor, like a
lawyer or an accountant. If you find anything you think may be wrong
or anything important that's been left out, you should let us know about
it. It may be against the law.
44 Fed. Reg. 49,987 (1979).
93.
1. Identifying information as to franchisor.
2. Business experience of franchisor's directors and executive
officers.
3. Business experience of the franchisor.
4. Litigation history.
5. Bankruptcy history.
6. Description of franchise.
7. Initial funds required to be paid by a franchisee.
8. Recurring funds required to be paid by a franchisee.
9. Affiliated persons the franchisee is required or advised to do
business with by the franchisor.
10. Obligations to purchase.
11. Revenues received by the franchisor in consideration of
purchases by a franchisee.
12. Financing arrangements.
13. Restriction of sales.
14. Personal participation required of the franchisee in the operation of the franchise.
15. Termination, cancellation, and renewal of the franchise.
16. Statistical information concerning the number of franchises
(and company-owned outlets).
17. Site selection.
18. Training programs.
19. Public figure involvement in the franchise.
20. Financial information concerning the franchisor.
Id. at 87-88.
94. Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (Opening Statement of Senator
Nelson).
95. Rulemaking, unlike adjudication, does not require proof of the unfair or deceptive practices of every entity brought within the scope of
the rule. To require such proof would reduce every rulemaking proceeding to a series of adjudications. Thus, evidence of unfair or deceptive practices in the marketing of one industry's franchise may be used
as the evidentiary basis for a rule that applies to more than one indus-

try.
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in industries that do not have a history of abuse dispute the
FTC's authority to apply the Rule to them. They argued that
while a company may be regulated by an industry-wide rule, an
entire industry may not be controlled by a rule applying to96 a
method of doing business that applies across industry lines.
Who Is Affected
The Rule has an obvious impact on franchisors: they must
disclose the information required, in the manner required, when
it is required. Preparation of the disclosure document involves
the expenditure of both time and money by the franchisor. In
an effort to avoid coverage by the Rule, many companies have
applied to the FTC for a stay of the Rule, or have filed suits challenging it. 97 For businesses which are not clearly franchises but
FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 45.
96. The Commission boldly asserts that evidence in the rulemaking
record of abuses in connection with the sale of franchises in some industries permits the application of the rule to all industries in which
franchising is used, and that there is no need to document in any way
the existence of abuses in each industry covered by the rule (Citations
omitted). We note that the Commission cites no authority for this
novel interpretation of the law. This is so simply because there is no
authority. The FTC cannot apply the rule to an entire industry in the
absence of any evidence of unfair or deceptive acts in that industry.
Evidence of unfair acts in one industry may not be used as the sole
evidentiary basis for the application of the rule to another unrelated
industry (Citation omitted). The fact that rulemaking may not require
proof of unfair or deceptive acts involving every company brought
within the scope of an industry-wide rule is clearly distinguishable
from the outrageous proposition that an agency needs absolutely no evidence of unfair acts within an industry before bringing that industry
within the purview of a rule that applies across industry lines.
Reply Memorandum of Automobile Importers of America, Inc., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-7144 (9th Cir. 1979).
97. Litigation challenging the Rule was consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Suit was first filed by the petroleum refiners:
Shell Oil Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Union Oil Co. of Cal., Exxon Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Chevron Chem. Co., Gulf Oil Corp.,
Getty Ref. and Mkt. Co., Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. See Emergency Motion for a Stay of the Effective Date of the Federal Trade Commission's
Franchise Disclosure Rule, Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, No. 79-7076 (9th Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Oil Co. Motion].
A number of other companies entered the litigation later: Snap-on
Tools Corp., General Elec. Co., Farm and Indus. Equip. Inst., Marathon Oil
Co., Schwinn Bicycle Co., The Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n of the United
States, Inc., General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., Chrysler Corp., American Motors Corp., Volkswagen of America, Inc., White Motor Co., International Harvester Co., Freightliner Corp., Paccar, Inc., Subaru of America,
Inc., Subaru Atl., Inc. and Subaru of S.Cal., Inc., Automobile Importers of
America, Inc., and Sinclair Mkt. Co. Id. at 2 n. 2. Some of these parties have
received advisory opinions from the FTC (see note 126 and accompanying
text infra) and are no longer parties to this action. The only remaining par-
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which involve some of the elements of franchising, the Rule may
create uncertinty about whether compliance is necessary. It
could prove to be a deterrent to entry into business operations
that include association with other businesses or even individuals.98
Although the Rule has no effect on already-existing
franchises, 99 it is specifically aimed at protecting prospective
franchisees 0 0 through discouragement of fraudulent claims by
franchisors. Disclosure requirements cannot prevent a prospective franchisee from making a bad business decision. They can
provide him with the facts he needs to make an informed decision, if he has the good sense to use them.10
In addition to the parties to the franchise contract, the Rule
also has an impact on administrators of state franchise regulations. 10 2 Because the federal Rule would preempt an inconsisties are the petroleum refiners and American Motors. (45 Fed. Reg. 26,347,
Apr. 18, 1980).
98. "[T]he 'rush to regulation' in the franchising field has produced a
significant area of legal uncertainty for businessmen contemplating operations which involve some degree of association with another business entity." Fern, supra note 24, at 1395.
99. "[T]he FTC Rule ... suffer[s] from numerous deficiencies, principally through its failure to touch the damages inflicted on thousands of existing and former franchisees by the practices against which such a Rule
might have provided substantial protection." H. BROWN, supra note 35, at
162.
As might be expected, those who are currently franchisees seem to
agree with the opinion that the Rule's lack of effect on them is a deficiency.
See generally comments submitted to the FTC: Letter from Gilbert A.
Meisgeier, Executive Director, Nat'l. Franchise Ass'n Coalition (Feb. 2,
1979) [hereinafter cited as NFAC comment]; Letter from George 0. Krueger, McDonald's franchisee, (Feb. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as McDonald's
franchisee comment].
100. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(e) defines prospective franchisee:
The term 'prospective franchisee' includes any person, including any
representative, agent, or employee of that person, who approaches or is
approached by a franchisor or franchise broker, or any representative,
agent, or employee thereof, for the purpose of discussing the establishment, or possible establishment, of a franchise relationship involving
such a person.
101. Though state and federal disclosure laws require that you be
given the kind of information that can alert you to signs of a swindle or
a bad business proposition, these laws won't protect you from yourself.
You are deceiving yourself if you think that the next franchise project
launched is bound to be another McDonald's or Holiday Inns or that
you won't have to work just as hard as any independent business operator to make a franchise outlet succeed. You must have the good sense
to watch for the warning signals and to investigate any deal thoroughly
before laying your money on the line. Any business investment, including franchising, is risky.
CHANGING TIMES, supra note 1, at 23.

102. See notes 199-204 and accompanying text infra.
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tent state law, 10 3 "franchise regulation at the state level could be
placed in a tenuous position."'1 4 In his comment on the
Guides, 0 5 the San Francisco Assistant District Attorney pointed
out that "[it is important that all areas of conflict [between the
Rule and the state law] be identified and that the Guidelines be
drafted in such a manner as to clear up any ambiguities created
by such conflicts.'

10 6

Of the franchisors that are concerned about the Rule's impact, "the group with the real problems [is] the selective distribution and special industry organizations caught in the cracks of
the Commission's interpretation of a 'product franchise.' "9107
The selective distribution companies have objected to coverage
by the Rule on the ground that they are not franchisors according to its definition: they do not exert a "significant degree of
control" over their franchisees' method of doing business, or
103. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,986 (1979).
104. Letter from James L. Karpen, Director, Office of Franchise and
Agent Licensing, Department of Commerce, State of Michigan to FTC (Feb.
17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Michigan commentI (comment submitted regarding the Rule).
105. Letter from S. Chandler Visher, Assistant District Attorney, City
and County of San Francisco, to FTC (Feb. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
San Francisco comment].
106. This comment goes on to describe specific areas of potential conflict
between the Rule and the California law, CAL. [CVIL] CODE § 1812.200 et
seq. (1979).
107. FTC Franchise Rule and Proposed Guides: Comments and Concerns, CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REVIEW, May 16, 1979, at 3 (hereinafter cited
as FRANCHISE REVIEW].
The "product franchise" and "package franchise" are functionally distinguishable. Indeed, the Guides themselves define product franchise and
package franchise separately. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,965 (1979).
However, the Guides state that only "two types of commercial relationships are defined as a franchise by the Rule: 'package and product
franchises' and 'business opportunity ventures.'" The Guides include a rationale for this grouping of package franchises with product franchises
(these terms are roughly equivalent to business format franchises and selective distributorships, respectively) by pointing out their common elements: "(i) distribution of goods or services associated with the
franchisor's trademark, (ii) significant control of, or significant assistance
to, the franchisee's method of operation, and (iii) required payments by the
franchisee to the franchisor." Id. See note 26 and accompanying text
supra.
See also Letter from Richard W. Pogue on behalf of the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n to FTC at 2 (Mar. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MYMA
comment] (comment submitted regarding the Rule):
[TI he loose definition of "franchise" as framed by the Commission is so
vague as to raise questions as to whether it is to include relationships
which have not been characterized by the abuses which the Rule is
aimed to prevent. To the extent of that vagueness the Rule might be
applied so as to impose onerous and burdensome requirements on certain parties without any demonstrated need or public benefit.
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give them "significant assistance;"' 10 8 they do not prescribe a
marketing plan; and they do not require payment of a franchise
10 9
fee.
These companies also argue that there is no justification for
including them in the Rule's coverage because there is no history of abuse in their method of operation. 110 The FTC's theory
is that evidence of abuses in one industry can be used to justify
coverage in another area of commerce where there is no evidence of abuse."' "The Commission's only justification for this
theory is that its own definition of 'franchising,' which is so
broad as to encompass dissimilar areas, makes the evidence relevant." 2 The selective distribution organizations feel that
108. Rexnord comment, supra note 23.
Many selective distributors claim that their businesses are individually
tailored to the requests of each particular distributor. Since these companies deal with sophisticated businessmen, "there is no 'this is how you run
a business' assistance of the nature found in franchising." Id. at 2.
"To be 'significant,' the control or assistance must result in a 'loss of
independence' because of increased dependence upon the franchisor." Letter from John R. F. Baer on behalf of Schwinn Bicycle Co. to FTC at 4 (Feb.
14, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Schwinn comment] (comment submitted regarding the Rule).
109. See notes 37, 38, 42, 43, 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
110. The Commission claims that the Rule was promulgated "in response to widespread evidence of deceptive and unfair practices in connection with the sale of franchises and business opportunity ventures."
43 Fed. Reg. 59,614.
An analysis of the complaints on the record made by Schwinn ...
reveals not a single complaint relating to a conventional supplier-distributorarrangementsuch as that used by Schwinn.
Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 29 (emphasis added).
"[I]n rulemaking it is important that the regulatory process, while necessary to correct ills which develop in a free marketplace, nevertheless regulate only to correct the abuses which create such ills and not to impinge on
the free enterprise system where such abuses do not exist." Koehring comment, supra note 23, at 2.
See also City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972) ("[a] regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly capricious if that
problem does not exist").
111. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 45.
112. Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum, Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. FTC, No. 79-7144, at 4 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MVMA
Motion to File Reply]. The footnote continued:
Suppose that "motor vehicle" were defined as any wheeled object
containing a motor, thus including power lawn mowers. To protect
highway motorists from collisions, a regulation requires all motor vehicle operators, including lawn mower users, to wear helmets. No evidence of collisions of lawn mowers is necessary because both lawn
mowers and automobiles have been defined as motor vehicles and evidence of collisions exists as to a type of motor vehicle.

1980]

FTC Franchise Disclosure Rule

"[s]uch a broad Rule is clearly unsupported by the record."' " 13
In the comment on the Guides which it submitted to the
FTC, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association observed
that the Rule "essentially aims at the correction or prevention of
two categories of abuse said to have been perpetrated by sellers
of 'franchises': (1) Fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of the
franchise . ..; (2) Sale of a franchise for a fee ...where the
114
franchisor does not provide the promised value in return."
The comment observes that abuses usually occur in franchise
relationships that have some of these characteristics:
(1) inexperienced and susceptible potential franchisees, i.e., "ma
and pa". . . often undercapitalized;
(2) . . .franchisees [who are] dependent upon the franchisor to
"learn the business,". . . or who, in respect to the day-to-day management of the business, are substantially controlled by the
franchisor and have no separate identity from that of the
franchisor;
(3) .. .undercapitalized, inexperienced and generally newly established franchisors with few, if any, established franchisees and a
new or novel product or service; and
(4) franchisors who succeed by "selling" the franchise instead of
the product ....115
In response to a request to investigate the objection to the
Rule of those types of business which have no history of abuse,
the Senate Select Committee on Small Business conducted a
hearing on July 17, 1979 to review the Rule's definition of
"franchise" and its potential impact. The question addressed at
the hearing was "whether the coverage of the Rule, in the manner the FTC suggests, is directed to the types of business which
they have identified as a problem and from which potential
'franchisees' need protection through mandatory Federal disclo113. Letter from Winston &Strawn to FTC, at 1 (Feb. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Winston & Strawn comment] (comment submitted regarding
the Rule).
[T] he Rule requires compliance not only by traditional franchisors but
also by virtually everyone selling trademarked goods at the wholesale
level. This is true whether or not a franchise fee is paid and whether or
not the trademark owner's control over the distributor is limited to that
necessary to preserve its rights under trademark law.
Id.
"Labeling some wholesalers as franchisors and requiring disclosure by
them creates competitive inequity with other wholesalers, cooperatives and
chains who do not have the cost burden of assembling and printing and
continuously updating disclosure statements." Letter from National-American Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n to FTC at 2 (Feb. 19, 1979) (comment submitted regarding the Rule).
114. lvIVMA comment, supra note 107, at 2-3.
115. Id. at 3.
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sure." 116 The Senate Committee made it clear that it believed
that in the absence of a history of abuse in an industry, the industry should not be covered by the Rule. 117 Furthermore, in
response to the FTC's observation that an industry could be exempted from the Rule if it documented a record free of abuses,
Senators Nelson and Boschwitz responded that the FTC should
have the burden of demonstrating past abuses before undertaking to regulate that industry. 118
On July 23, 1979, the Small Business Committee wrote the
FTC chairman that "the coverage of the Rule has been extended
to certain business relationships, including industrial distributors and farm equipment manufacturers, without any clear evidence of a need to do so." 119 The Senators "urge[d] the
Commission, at a minimum, to insure that the interpretations of
coverage, as reflected in the final guide 120 accompanying the
Rule, are significantly narrowed to exclude the normal wholesale-retail business relationship .... "121 They also recommended that
the Commission should seriously consider a further delay of the
October 21, 1979 effective date of the entire Rule until such time as
you (a) either demonstrate evidence of "deceptive and unfair practices". .. in industrial distribution schemes ... or clarify their exclusion from coverage . . .; and (b) prepare analyses of the likely
costs and paperwork which would be imposed .... 122
116. Senate Hearing, supra note 5 (opening statement of Senator Nelson).
117. Senator Nelson stated: "[I]f you do not have any documented significant abuses that are endemic in the business, why cover them [the selective distributors] even if your interpretation of the Rule does? What evil
are you trying to cure, if the evil does not exist?" Senate Hearing, supra

note 5, at 66.

118. [T] here is an exemption provided for in the Act, and in an industry that can come in and make a documented caseSenator Nelson. Why should they make a documented case of [noj
abuse to meet a goddamn rule that does not make any sense if there is
no abuse.

Why is it not the other way, that you come in with the evidence of

the abuse, or keep your nose out of people's business?
Senator Boschwitz. Why should they have the burden of proving
no abuse?
Id. at 66-67.
119. Letter from Senate Select Committee on Small Business to Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (July 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Letter] (Senate Hearings on FTC Franchise Disclosure
Rule of July 17, 1979).
120. See note 7 supra.

121. Senate Letter, supra note 119.
122. Id.
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It has been maintained by selective distribution companies
that their doubt regarding whether they are covered by the Rule
renders it void for vagueness. 123 It has also been suggested that
the Rule might be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 124 Although these arguments have been raised, the companies' proceedings with the FTC have focused on other issues.
Shortly after the Guides were revised, Schwinn Bicycle Co.
(a selective distribution organization) 125 received the first "informal staff advisory opinion" from the FTC that "the relationship between Schwinn and its dealers ... does not constitute a
franchise under the rule.' 126 This opinion was based on the fact
that the only payments made by dealers to Schwinn are to
purchase bicycles at bona fide wholesale prices. The FTC decided that such payments do not constitute a "required payment" under the Rule, 127 an essential element of an FTC-defined
"franchise." A necessary aspect of the bona fide wholesale price
exclusion is that Schwinn does not dictate to its dealers what
quantity of inventory to purchase. 128 Furthermore, the opinion
applies only to Schwinn, "and only to the extent that Schwinn's
123. '"The notice demanded by the Due Process Clause is wholly lacking
in the Rule because its definitional element utilizes nebulous criteria which
afford little effective guidance as to the scope of coverage." Schwinn Brief,
supra note 7, at 49.
124. Winston & Strawn comment, supra note 113, at 4:
"On its face, the Rule is so broad and burdensome as to place it on the
outer limits of substantive due process and to create an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce."
125. Schwinn Bicycle Co., a selective distributor, has received similar advisory opinions from California and Virginia. Cal. Dep't of Corporations,
Interp. Op. No. 71/2F of Feb. 17, 1971. The bona fide wholesale price exemption is now available in some states. See CAL. [CORP.] CODE § 31011(a); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121
, § 703 (1977).
126. Letter from John M. Tifford, Program Advisor for Franchising, FTC,
to John R. F. Baer, Keck, Mahin & Cate, representing Schwinn Bicycle Co.
(Aug. 3, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Schwinn Advisory Opinion] (Informal
Staff Advisory Opinion).
127. "Such payments do not constitute a 'required payment' pursuant to
Section 436.2(a) (2)-as that term is interpreted by the Commission in its
final guides at pages 5-6." Id.
"[T]he Commission's objective [is] that 'required payment' capture all
sources of hidden franchise fees, [and] the Commission will not construe as
'required payments' any payments made by a person at a bona fide wholesale price for reasonable amounts of merchandise to be used for resale." 44
Fed. Reg. 49,965 (1979). This is a significant change from the previous
Guides.
128. "[The guidelines fail to indicate in what circumstances a person is
deemed to have been 'required' to make payments." Letter from Lewis G.
Rudnick, Rudnick & Wolfe, to Lawrence Mackey, Chief of the Franchise Division of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General at 2 (Feb. 23, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rudnick & Wolfe comment] (comment submitted regarding the Guides).
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present and future business activities conform to the information furnished in its request [for exemption from coverage] .,129
The FTC's decision on the above advisory opinion makes
the Rule's scope of coverage more consistent with pre-existing
state disclosure laws. In twelve of the fourteen states that have
a franchise disclosure provision, 130 the purchase of goods at a
bona fide wholesale price is an exception to the franchise fee
requirement in the definition of franchise. A bona fide wholesale price is "a fair payment for goods purchased at a comparable level of distribution and no part of which constitutes a
payment for the right to enter into the franchise business.
Goods sold at a bona fide wholesale price include goods sold to
the franchisee for resale .... -131 In response to the numerous
objections of selective distribution companies to including
purchase of inventory in the definition of required payment, the
revised Guides state that "the Commission will not construe as
'required payments' any payments made by a person at a bona
fide wholesale price for reasonable amounts of merchandise to
132
be used for resale."'
According to the Statement of Basis and Purpose, 133 "the
main benefit of franchising to the franchisor is to raise low-cost
capital by collecting franchise fees from franchisees, and ...
the attractiveness of this low-cost capital creates the potential
for deception."'13 4 Selective distribution companies are not rais129. Schwinn Advisory Opinion, supra note 126 (This opinion is based on
the specific facts furnished to the Commission by Schwinn; it is not binding.
Other companies have subsequently received similar Advisory Opinions, as
well as concurrences by the Commissioners.).
130. The states which now have statutes requiring disclosure by
franchisors are: California (CAL. [CORP.] CODE § 3100 et seq.. (West Supp.
1980)); Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT. § 482 E-1 et seq. (1976)); Illinois (ILL REV.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2,§ 701 etseq. (1977)); Indiana (IND.CODE, tit. 23, ch. 2.5, § 1 et
seq. (1972)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., art. 56, § 345 et seq. (Cum. Supp.
1977)); Michigan (MICH. Comp. LAWS § 445.1501 et seq. (1977)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 80C. 01 et seq. (1976)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 5119-01 et seq. (Supp. 1977)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 650.005 et seq. (1977));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28-1 et seq. (1956)); South Dakota (S.D.
COMPILED LAWS § 37-5A-1 et seq. (1977)); Virginia (VA. CODE § 13.1-557 et
seq. (1950)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010 et seq. (1976)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. § 553.01 et seq. (1975)).

131. Winston &Strawn comment, supranote 113, at 5 (quoting Franchise
Disclosure Act of Illinois, Rules and Regulations, Rule 106).
132. 44

Fed. Reg. 49,968 (1979).

The Rule says that a franchise fee must exceed $500 within the first six
months. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2). The Proposed Guides included purchases
of inventory in this $500 minimum; the Revised Guides do not include inventory purchases. Id.
133. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621-59,733 (1978).
134. MVMA Motion to File Reply, supra note 112, at 6 n. 4 (referring to 43
Fed. Reg. 59,698-99 (1978)).
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ing capital when they sell merchandise at a bona fide wholesale
price. 135 The abuses at which the Rule is directed are unlikely
to occur in this situation because "[t]here is no incentive to
'take the money and run;'. . . such an action would only destroy
the distribution system upon which [the selective distributor]
1 36
depends to market its product."'
Selective distribution companies have claimed that even
where the franchisor "suggests" a minimum purchase of initial
inventory to the franchisee, where the goods are, sold at a bona
fide wholesale price no franchise fee is involved because the
purchase price is not a source of low-cost capital. 3 7 This claim
is modified by the concession that the franchisor may not require purchase of inventory that cannot be turned over within a
reasonable time without running afoul of a franchise fee prob38
lem.1
Issues Raised by the Rule
The basis for the issues raised by the Rule is the problems
inherent in trying to apply a common standard across broad industry lines. 139 "Because franchising is not an industry, a product, or a service, but is instead a method of doing business or a
method of distribution, 140 the Franchise Rule is not limited in its
application to any particular industry or industries." 141 A
135. Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 43-44; MVMA Motion to File Reply,
supra note 112, at 6 n. 4.
136. Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 44.
137. Koehring comment, supra note 39, at 4 ("It should ... be recognized
that such an adequate inventory requirement [where goods are sold at a
bona fide wholesale price] is not the equivalent of a minimum inventory

purchasing requirement where the producer is seeking sales to dealers as a
source of low cost capital.").
138. If the producer suggests to a new dealer, without imposing any
requirement of a specified minimum amount of inventory, that his initial inventory purchase should be $100,000 in order to adequately service his customers, and the dealer proceeds to "turn" that inventory five

times during the year, producing a profit of $50,000, or 50% return ...it
should be clear that no "initial fee" has been packaged into the initial
inventory purchase. Both producer and dealer are making their profit

through a normal buy-sell relationship.
Letter from Val. A. Weber and Charles N. Besser, Reuben &Proctor, on behalf of Snap-on Tools Corp. to FTC at 4-5 (Mar. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Snap-on Tools Corp. comment] (comment submitted regarding the New
Guides).
139. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.

140. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,623 (1978).
141. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 7.

The rulemaking record contains overwhelming evidence of abuses
in the sale of franchises, as defined in the rule. Because such abuses

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:637

spokesman for the FTC justified this approach with the explanation that "[i]f we had to go on an industry by industry basis it
would in essence work a regulatory burden that might be unmanageable."' 142
Those companies that are disputing their coverage by the
Rule point out that the Franchise Rule disregards significant differences which exist between industries. In their emergency
motion for a stay of the Rule, the oil companies pointed out that
even the FTC staff had "called into doubt the basic concept of
regulating with one rule the marketing practices of industries
'as disparate as gasoline and hamburgers.' ",143 "The Rule as it is
promulgated is unreasonably and unnecessarily vague and overbroad. The Proposed Guidelines magnify instead of minimize
this problem. The result is the unjustified imposition of a substantial economic burden upon a class substantially larger than
the target class." 144
Those companies (and in some cases entire industries)
which have no record of abuse in their business relations with
their dealers/distributors probably have the strongest argument
against coverage under the Rule. It is difficult to understand the
justification for imposing the burden of compliance on a company which has done nothing to demonstrate that it requires administrative regulation. Senator Nelson acknowledged the basic
injustice of this approach when he asked an FTC official, "What
evil are you trying to cure, if the evil does not exist?"1 45 The
Senate Committee on Small Business seems to feel that an industry should not have the burden of documenting a problemfree history to obtain exclusion from coverage by a Rule that
"does not make any sense if there is no abuse. Why is it not the
stem from the nature of the franchise relationship rather than from the
characteristics of any particular industry, such evidence is sufficient to

warrant application of the rule to all franchises, as defined, without
need to document the existence of numerous abuses in each and every
one of the many industries in which franchising is used.
Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 34 (quoting FrC's response to Oil Co. application to the Commission for a stay of the Rule).
142. Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 81.
143. Id. at 13 (quoting 1977 Trade Comm'n Hearings, at 9). The staff fur-

ther stated: "Is the broad sweep of the definition justified? Should all industries that franchise be included? Should particular types of franchises
be excluded, such as those involving minimal investments, sophisticated

and experienced franchisees or business opportunity schemes?"
144. Winston & Strawn comment, supra note 113, at 3.
145. Senate Hearing,supranote 5, at 66. See note 117 and accompanying

text supra.
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other way, that you [the FTC] come in with the evidence of the
1 46
abuse, or keep your nose out of people's business?"'
It has already been mentioned that Schwinn, a selective distribution organization, had received an advisory opinion from
the FTC that it is not covered under the Rule because the payments it receives from its dealers are limited to purchases of inventory at a bona fide wholesale price.' 47 On the basis of this
advisory opinion, Schwinn and the FTC have stipulated that
Schwinn's petition for a stay of the Rule in the Ninth Circuit will
be dismissed. 14 8 Although the advisory opinion applies only to
Schwinn, 149 other selective distributors have received similar
opinions because they do not collect a franchise fee.
While these companies may thus be through with their dispute with the FTC, potential problems still lurk behind this
seemingly-conclusive resolution. In the first place, there is no
assurance that just because one company which charges no
franchise fee received an advisory opinion of no coverage, the
next company with a similar method of doing business will receive a similar opinion; the FTC makes these decisions on a
case-by-case basis.1 50 In the second place, any company that receives such an advisory opinion runs the risk of losing it if it
makes any change in its method of doing business. 151 Because
the other possible reasons for excluding a selective distributor
from coverage (they do not prescribe a marketing plan for the
franchisor, and do not give him significant assistance or control)
were not addressed by the FTC, loss of the bona fide wholesalp
price exemption might have serious consequences: possible renewed coverage by the Rule.
146. Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 67. See note 118 and accompanying
text supra.

147. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
148. The "proceeding is stayed with respect to Schwinn until October 18,
1979 and shall be dismissed on October 18, 1979 if the Commission concurs
in the staff advice letter on or before October 8, 1979. . . ." Stipulation for
Dismissal of Schwinn Bicycle Co.'s Petition for Judicial Review of the
Franchise Rule, Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. FTC, No. 78-3680 at 3 (1979).

It should be noted that according to the Commission's internal rule, in
an important decision, the Commissioners must concur in the staff advisory
opinion.
149. Schwinn Advisory Opinion, supra note 126 ("[t]he views expressed

in this informal staff opinion may be relied upon only by Schwinn").
150. The goal of a bright line rule is solving this problem by "shortening
and simplifying the adjudicative process and ... clarifying the law in advance." See note 80 supra. Arguably, then, the Commission's case-by-case

decision process on coverage ineffectuates the advantages of rulemaking.
151. The "informal staff opinion may be relied upon ... only to the extent that Schwinn's present and future business activities conform to the
information furnished in its request." Schwinn Advisory Opinion, supra

note 126.
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It has already been mentioned that the doubt as to their coverage under the Rule is at the very least an inconvenience to
selective distribution organizations. 15 2 At this point the doubt
remains for the hundreds who have not received a staff advisory
opinion, and it also remains to a lesser extent even for those
who are excluded because they do not charge a franchise fee.
What these companies need, and deserve, from the FTC is consistency and clarity of coverage. As one of them observed in its
comment on the Rule, "it would be well to include certain
changes to the regulations which would make it crystal clear
that companies which do business under conventional distributorship arrangements with little or no control over the distribu53
tor are not covered by the proposed regulations.'
These arguments have in common an underlying acceptance of the need for the Rule in appropriate circumstances; their
claim is just that it should be applied to someone else. There is
an even more basic argument that could be made by any of the
three types of franchisors: 15 4 The Rule itself is invalid. Two arguments have been advanced in support of this proposition: (1)
The FTC lacked the authority to promulgate such a rule when it
undertook the project; and (2) the FTC failed to follow the
rulemaking procedure required by Magnuson-Moss.
A threshhold question is whether pre- or post-MagnusonMoss rulemaking procedures are applicable. The key to this issue is whether the FTC's receipt of evidence was "substantially
completed" at the time the Magnuson-Moss Amendments to the
FTC Act took effect. 155 "Perhaps the most salient fact refuting
any claim that the rule was substantially completed prior to the
effective date of the Magnuson-Moss Amendments is the FTC's
own inability to promulgate the rule sooner than December 21,
56
1978, four years after the final closing of the public record.'
The FTC closed the public rulemaking record on November
20, 1974, but it appears that it continued to receive information
pertinent to the Rule after that date. 157 The argument is that the
152. See notes 98 & 123 and accompanying text supra.
153. Koehring comment, supra note 39, at 2. These are business format
and business opportunity, as well as selective distribution, franchisors.
154. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
155. Oil Companies' Reply to the FTC's Opposition Motion, Shell Oil Co.
v. FTC, No. 79-7076 (9th Cir. 1979) at 8-9 [hereinafter cited as Oil Co. Reply].
156. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 52.
157. Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 54.
That information includes ex parte consultations with a number of companies involved, as well as ex parte contacts with the International
Franchise Association and a Franchise Rule Baseline Study which the FTC
retained Arthur Young & Co. to prepare.
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Commission's reception of data after the effective date of
Magnuson-Moss 158 invokes its rulemaking procedure. The FTC
claims that the Rule is not a Magnuson-Moss rule because it
falls within the grandfather clause.' 59 Those who dispute the
Rule's validity maintain that the grandfather clause is inapplicable because the Rule was not close enough to completion at the
time Magnuson-Moss became effective.
The other argument that the Rule is invalid is that even if
the FTC was not required to follow the Magnuson-Moss
rulemaking procedures, the Commission nevertheless failed to
comply with the rulemaking requirements of Section 553 of the
APA. 160 These requirements are notice, an opportunity to com16 1
The two
ment, and a concise general statement of the rule.
goals of such requirements are "to require the agency to educate
itself before promulgating rules that bind the public," thereby
"avoid[ing] ill-informed and imprudent administrative action,"' 62 and to guarantee fairness to those affected by the Rule.
The FTC's reception of information after it closed the public
record on the Rule may not have violated the first of these goals,
since the information may have served to educate the Commission, but it did deny fair treatment to those affected by the Rule
by denying them notice and an opportunity to comment. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
pointed out "the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with the idea of reaon the merits which undergirds all of our
soned decision making
163
law."'
administrative
It has been held that an administrative rule which is not
promulgated in accordance with rulemaking procedures is
158. July 4, 1975.
159. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
160. Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 62.
161. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
(1976), describes three procedural requirements: notice of the proposed
rulemaking, § 553(b); an opportunity for interested persons to comment,
§ 553(c); and a concise general statement of basis and purpose of the rule,

§ 553(c).
Magnuson-Moss adopts these procedures as well. Pub. L. No. 93-637
§ 202(a) (1975). Therefore, the following arguments are applicable whether

or not Magnuson-Moss is found to be operative.
162. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 53.

163. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). The court also stated that "[eiven the possibility that there is
here one administrative record for the public and this court and another for
the Commission and those 'in the know' is intolerable. . . ." Id. at 54.
"Moreover, a dialogue is meaningless unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the public." Id. at 54, 56.
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void.' 64 Since they received negative advisory opinions, the oil
companies and American Motors Corp. are continuing the court
fight using these arguments. 165 The Ninth Circuit is faced with a
twofold decision: It must decide whether pre- or postMagnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures were applicable, and
then decide whether the appropriate procedural requirements
were properly adhered to.
In addition to these attacks on the Rule's validity and application, numerous comments have addressed themselves, not to
the Rule itself, but to the Interpretive Guides. Marathon Oil's
comment pointed out that there is "an apparent inconsistency,
perhaps deriving from no more than ambiguous language, between the Guides on the one hand and the Rule and Statement
of Basis and Purpose on the other."'1 66 The major problem
seems to be the scope of coverage. Companies which feel their
exclusion from the Rule's definition of "franchise" is clear are
worried that the "misleading and ambiguous" Guides might
draw them back into the Rule's grasp. 167 The oil companies
claim that the Guides vary from the text of the Rule so much
that they "constitute an illegal and improper rulemaking proceeding under the label of 'guides.'"168 The International
Franchise Association observed that "the Rule and the Statement are consistent with the requirements of the Uniform
170
69
Franchise Offering Circular' while the Guidelines are not.'
Furthermore, "[ilt appears to be unprecedented for the Federal Trade Commission to have both an Industry Guide and a
7
Trade Regulation Rule on the very same subject matter."' ' The
following dialogue occurred during the Senate Committee on
Small Business hearing on the Rule:
164. See generally Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,

393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 217 U.S. 921 (1974) ("It is not consonant
with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the
basis of ... data that, [to a] critical degree, is [sic] known only to the

agency."); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) ("The rule making provisions of the [APA] . . . were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application.").
165. See note 97 supra.
166. Letter from Richard W. Pogue on behalf of Marathon Oil Co. to FTC
at 1 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Marathon Oil Co. comment].
167. Schwinn comment, supra note 108, at 2-3.
168. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 15.
169. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,970 (1979). The UFOC provides acceptable franchise

disclosure requirements in lieu of the disclosure requirements set forth in
§ 436.1(a)-(e) of the Rule.
170. Letter from Philip F. Zeidman on behalf of International Franchise
Association to FTC at 7 (Mar. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as IFA comment].
171. Schwinn comment, supra note 108, at 18.
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Senator Nelson: I guess this is the first time they have undertaken to have an interpretive guideline to go along with the rule, to
advise what the rule means.
Maybe they should write the rule a little
Senator Boschwitz:
172
more clearly.
The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association's position is that
"[t]he applicable statute does not provide for the Proposed
Guides .. .and we therefore submit that they are gratuitous,
effect in law,
confusing and misleading and that they have 1no
73
and that therefore they should be withdrawn.'
Comments from Those Affected
Business format franchisors have complained that the language of the Rule should be clarified with respect to some of the
terms used. For instance, "parent" and "holding company" are
not distinguished or defined. The International Franchise Association suggests a specific definition, 174 since "[i]nformation
concerning the parent . . . can be of substantial significance to
the prospective franchisee."' 175 "Similar products or services"
also needs more specific definition, to protect franchisors from
to a franchisee who might
having to disclose all their operations
76
establish such other operations.
Others commented on "significant assistance or control."
One company felt "[tihe concept of assistance to the dealer, as
an element of a 'Product' Franchise, should be abandoned. Protection of the franchisee is the premise upon which the Rule is
founded. Rendering assistance benefits the franchisee and
177
The probtherefore is in keeping with the intent of the Rule."'
lem with this suggestion is that it is based on a misconception of
the Rule's premise. The Rule is intended to benefit the franchisee, not through any means imaginable, but only by requiring
the franchisor to disclose the information necessary to make an
informed decision. Assistance is one of the elements in the
Rule's definition of "franchise;" all this means is that it indicates
a franchise relationship, not that assistance is bad or should be
avoided (unless one is trying to avoid coverage as a franchisor
under the Rule).
172. Senate Hearings,supra note 5, at 24.
173. MVMA comment, supra note 107, at 1.
174. "A 'parent' should not include other subsidiaries of the parent since
such a broad requirement would place an undue burden on franchisors."
IFA comment, supra note 170, at 5.

175. Id.
176. Id. at 16-17.
177. Snap-on Tools Corp. comment, supra note 138, at 10.
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A more typical comment was that it is "critical that the final
Guidelines specifically define 'significant degree of control or
assistance.' "178 Since a certain amount of control is inevitable
in any distributorship, the Rule would be clarified by a careful
delineation of what control is "significant."'179 The Rule's definition should be limited to provisions that "make the distributor
substantially dependent upon the producer's expertise .. .for
making the distributorship profitable .... Significant control
should ... be defined to include such controls as ... go to the
internal operations and management of the franchisee."' 8 0 "The
important question ... is whether the assistance or control exercised by the producer is so great as to subjugate the independence and identity of the dealer to that of the producer."'' 1
The "substantial dependence" of the franchisee must be
carefully defined to avoid any danger that franchises may be
treated as securities, 8 2 which may be broadly defined as putting
one's money in the hands of another. Because the success of
the typical franchise (and therefore the return on the franchisee's investment) depends to some extent on the efforts of
the franchisee, franchises have generally been held not to be securities. 183 Nevertheless, it was held that where risk capital was
paid to the franchisor but the franchisee "received no 'practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enter178. Winston &Strawn comment, supra note 113, at 10.
[TI he Final Guidelines should state that certain provisions which commonly appear together in distributorship agreements do not individually or collectively constitute a "significant degree of control or
assistance over the franchisee's method of operation." Among these
common provisions are terms
(1) requiring the distributor to periodically furnish the Producer
with financial, sales, inventory, etc. data;
(2) designating the territory within which the distributor may use
the trademark;
(3) requiring distributor compliance with applicable governmental
rules and regulations;
(4) requiring the distributor to promote the sale of the Producer's

products; or
(5) requiring the distributor to purchase a specified amount of the
Producer's goods or to maintain a specific sales volume.

Id. at 11-12.
179. Id. at 10-11. See Rexnord comment, supra note 108, at 4.
180. Id. at 12 n. 17.
181. Koehring comment, supra note 39, at 4.
182. See IFA comment, supra note 170, at 30.

183. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972)
(franchise to operate a steak house was not a "security"); accord, Nash &
Assocs., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973) (franchise to

operate a restaurant was not a "security").
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prise' in return, an investment contract security existed. '184
Thus, a franchisor must avoid exercising supervision so close
that the franchise contract can be classified as a security, with
its attendant state and federal securities law regulation.
A common criticism from franchisors was that this is an
awkward effort to regulate three different methods of distribution by one rule. 185 The selective distribution organizations object to being combined with business format franchisors in the
Guides. 186 Because the varieties of franchises differ so widely,
attempts to develop rules applicable to all of them are bound
either to be so broad as to be meaningless, or to be qualified to
death. 187 "[Ciharacteristics of the different types of franchise
agreements may lead to different treatments of apparently com88
mon legal problems.'
A basic objection that selective distribution franchisors
have to the Guides is the use of the term "distributorship" to
describe business opportunity ventures, because this terminology leads to confusion between the two types of franchising. 189
The San Francisco Assistant District Attorney made the point
that work-at-home business opportunity schemes are covered
by the California statute, but have been omitted from coverage
by the Rule. 190
The National Franchise Association Coalition, which consists of seventeen franchisee organizations, wrote the FTC "to
express the gratification of franchisees to the Commission for
having passed the rule . . . [ijn spite of the fact that this rule
does not have any great effect upon those franchisees who are
already locked into one-sided agreements that fail to protect
184.

CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD,

supra note 20, at 512 (quoting State v. Ha-

waii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 648, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971).

185. IFA comment, supra note 170, at 1.
186. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
187. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 71 (citing Statement of Paul Rand
Dixon, Chairman, hearings pursuant to S. Rep. 40 before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. Part I, at 81 (1965)) (emphasis added):
The many varieties of the franchise systems differ among themselves
so widely that any attempt to state rules applicable to all such systems
must either be so broad as to approach the meaningless or tailored with
numerous qualifications in order to fit all varieties of franchises. It
would be foolhardyfor one to issueflat pronouncements declaring the
state of the law as it pertains to franchise agreements.
188. Caine, supra note 12, at 352. See notes 95, 96, 139-43 and accompanying text supra.
189. ' The most common types of business opportunity ventures are distributorship,rack jobbing and vending machine routes." 44 Fed. Reg. 49,968
(1979) (emphasis added).

190. San Francisco comment, supra note 105, at 2.
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them from abuses of franchisors."' '9 A McDonald's franchisee
wrote that the Rule is "a most welcomed development.' 1 92 He
felt, though, that "the ruling falls short of the mark in that it attempts to bring equity only prior to the initiation of a franchise
agreement and nothing [sic] about guaranteeing equity during
1 93
the course of the agreement.'
The Minnesota Department of Commerce suggested that
filing the proposed disclosure document with the FTC by the
franchisor should be required.1 9 4 Even in the absence of any review by the Commission of the substance of the document,
which would be the aim of a registration requirement, it is "in
the best interests of the Commission to know the type of disclosure which is actually being used pursuant to its rule.' 19 The
FTC chose not to require registration of the document, however,
to avoid "a massive new federal bureaucracy comparable in
1 96
scope and size to the Securities and Exchange Commission.'
"Although the agency thus avoided any self-burden, it also forfeited the implicitly cleansing impact of any public
filing .... "197 Furthermore, "the mere filing of such information
with the federal government would subject the material to the
deterrent effect of a criminal penalty for any fraudulent information."198
The Kentucky Attorney General felt that his office was
much more capable than the FTC of protecting state consumers
under state law. 199 Adopting a basic states' rights position, he
pointed out that the federal bureaucracy is too often inefficient
and ineffective. 200 Michigan's comment expressed concern that
the Rule could impair the states' ability to modify franchise regulations as needed. 20 1 "[I]t seems likely that an unintended
191. NFAC comment, supra note 99, at 1. See note 98 and accompanying
text supra.

192. McDonald's franchisee comment, supra note 99.
193. Id.
194. Letter from Minnesota Dep't of Commerce to FTC 3 (Feb. 12, 1979)
(comment submitted regarding the New Guides).

195. Id.
196. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 4 ("The current franchise

Rule staff consists of four attorneys and several others throughout is [sic]
10 regional offices, as contrasted with the SEC staff of 691 attorneys."). See

id. at n.3.
197. H. BROWN, supra note 35, at 167.
198. Id.
199. Letter from Kentucky Attorney General to FrC (Feb. 12, 1979)

(comment submitted regarding the New Guides).
200. Id.
201. Michigan comment, supra note 104.
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side effect of the Commission's approach to preemption 20 2 will
*.. result in the elimination of the Uniform Franchise Offering
Circular 20 3 as a viable alternative to the Commission's disclo' '2 °4
sure format.
205

The requirement that financial information be disclosed
prompted several criticisms. In the first place, it is not unusual
for financial statements received by franchisors from franchisees to be unreliable 20 6 so that for the prospective franchisee
such disclosure would be deceptive. 20 7 Furthermore, receipt of
financial information may "giv[e] a prospective franchisee a
-208
false sense of security ....
To the requirement that a franchisor supply an income
statement, 20 9 one small businessman replied "Nuts!" 210 He said
that he had taken initial losses to build his system, and objected
to being required to disclose his costs of doing business. 211 He
argued that the prospective franchisee should base his investment decision on a" 'free market judgment' of relative values he
receives from competing franchisors. ''2 12 The FTC might respond that knowledge of the franchisor's taking losses is relevant to the franchisee's decision, since in this situation the
exhaustion of the franchisor's personal fortune could have serious consequences for the franchisee.
A related objection came from Mr. Hero Sandwich Systems:
"[I]t seems a violation of our privacy to be forced to release
complete, detailed financials to every prospective franchisee. . . . What right has that person been granted . . . [to]
know our salaries, life insurance, etc.?" 213 Apparently Mr. Hero
202. See 44 Fed. Reg. 49,971 (1979).
203. Id. at 49,970. But see note 169 and accompanying text supra. See
also note 30 supra.
204. Michigan comment, supra note 104.
205. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a) (1980).
206. "[Statements would be unreliable] for such reasons as varying accounting practices, extravagant salaries and expense accounts for owneremployees and inclusion of personal expenses." Rudnick & Wolfe comment, supra note 128, at 19.
207. Id.
208. Minnesota comment, supra note 194, at 4.
209. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a) (20) (1980).
210. Letter from Sheldon Leighton, President, Bailey Employment System, Inc. to FrC (Jan. 2, 1979) (comment submitted regarding the New
Guides).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Letter from Robert S. Ginsberg, Vice-President of Mr. Hero Sandwich Systems, Inc., to FTC at 5 (Feb. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Mr. Hero
comment] (comment submitted regarding the Rule).
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would not object to providing this information to a serious prospective franchisee; the problem is the requirement that it be
given to every casual inquirer. The International Franchise Association 2 14 commented that if the disclosure of excessive detail
is mandated, "trade secrets and other confidential matters may
be jeopardized. It is doubtful that this harsh result was in2 15
tended by the Rule."
Impact of the Rule
"Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue
it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of
the air, and every living thing that moveth on the face of the earth."
So sayeth the Lord in the Book of Genesis.
This quotation has been taken literally by Arthur Treacher as
to the fish, Colonel Sanders as to the fowl, and Ray Kroc as to every
other living thing. It would seem that franchisors are indeed on the
side of the angels. Not necessarily so. The Bible can be quoted to
support any given premise; it is well known that the Lord giveth
and the Lord taketh away.
216 His avenging angel this year is the Federal Trade Commission.
For most package or business format franchisors, disclosure
has always existed. Their objection is to the FTC's "heavy
handed" attempt to regulate the relationships between the
franchisor and the franchisee. 2 17 Since most states have some
type of franchise law, and fourteen currently have disclosure requirements, package franchisors expect to be regulated. For the
large franchisors, who already have sophisticated accounting
procedures and who currently provide prospective franchisees
with financial information about the business, disclosure will be
2 18
a relatively simple matter of producing one more statement.
The impact of the Rule will be much heavier on the smaller, less
affluent franchisors, for whom compliance will require an addi21 9
tional load On existing staff, as well as outside assistance.
Obviously, franchisors' expenses of compliance will be
passed on to new franchisees, and from them to consumers.
Snap-on Tools warned that "the Commission should stop and
carefully consider the inflationary impact which added govern214. See note 52 supra.
215. IFA comment, supra note 170, at 13.

216. J. Thomas Brown, attorney, Miami, Florida, formerly senior vice
president, Burger King Corp., in FRANCHISE REVIEW, supra note 107, at 8.
217. Id.
218. See Mr. Hero comment, supra note 213, at 4.
219. Letter from Marc B. Rubin, Vice President, National Fire Repair,

Inc. to FTC (Feb. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as National Fire Repair comment] (comment submitted regarding the Rule).
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ment regulation will have .... -220 Inflationary additional costs

include preparation of offering circulars, amending registered
circulars with the states, and preparing separate statements of
change in financial position.2 21 Estimates of the cost of compliance vary widely, 222 but whatever the costs are, they will ulti-

mately be borne by the consumer.
The Rule's costs of compliance will weigh most heavily on
those least able to afford compliance: new companies. Its economic impact on the price of franchises will have the effect of
frightening prospective franchisees and franchisors out of the
market and will therefore have an adverse impact on competition. 223 It may stifle the growth of franchising. Economic com-

petition is commonly believed to be in the public interest. Yet it
has been argued that the Rule "would preempt the field to only
large corporations and thus impede competition. Most present
franchisors probably would not be in existence if some of these
'224
rules had been in effect earlier.
The final issue with respect to the Rule's impact is whether
those who are covered will have a private right of action under
the Rule. "The Commission believes that the courts should and
will hold that any person injured by a violation of the rule has a
private right of action against the violator, under the Federal
220. Snap-on Tools Corp. comment, supra note 138, at 6.
221. Letter from Watercare Corp. to FTC at 4 (Feb. 20, 1979) [hereinafter

cited as Watercare Comment] (comment submitted regarding the Rule).

222. The Commission estimates that cost of compliance would be about

$10,000 in legal fees for a large firm, $2500 for a small firm. Senate Hearing,

supra note 5, at 89 (statement of Mr. Kramer, FTC).

Private industry estimates of cost of compliance vary: $7000-$10,000 for

a small company (National Fire Repair comment, supra note 219); $125,000
for a large company (Schwinn Brief, supra note 7, at 18); $640,000-$2,400,000
for a large public corporation (Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 83 (citing
affidavits of S. Peter Manchester (Mobil) and J.D. Froggatt (Chevron)).
223. Watercare comment, supra note 221, at 4.
"It will stifle competition rather then enhance it! This smothering of
competition will particularly affect the 'small' businessman, the entrepreneur who [sic] government should be protecting and encouraging." Mr.
Hero comment, supra note 213, at 1.
"Larger manufacturing firms may wish to consider arguing for a very
broad definitional interpretation in hope of creating another legal barrier to
new prospective entrants to their markets and another costly legal burden
to small competitors already present." Rollinson, Editorial Comment, in
Fern, The Overbroad Scope of Franchise Regulation: A Definitional Dilemma, 34 Bus. LAw 1387, 1400 (Apr., 1979).
224. Watercare Corp. comment, supra note 221, at 4.
"The young man who testified here this morning... said if he had to
comply . . .he would never have gotten into the business ... " Senate
Hearing,supra note 5, at 89 (Senator Nelson).
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Although

the FTC's view is that "private actions would add a valuable dimension to its own enforcement efforts, '226 it concedes that
"there is some question about whether federal courts will permit individual investors to sue for relief from a Rule violation."

227

In fact, there really appears to be little question that federal
courts will not permit private suits. Decisions on this issue with
respect to another administrative agency, the SEC, indicate that
the Supreme Court is becoming hostile to implied private
causes of action. Furthermore, there is no longstanding tradition of private rights; their first recognition by the Supreme
Court was in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak228 in 1963. Almost immediately, the Court began to retrench from this decision, until in
1979 it said that "in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes
of action, and we follow that stricter standard today." 229 Finally,
the FTC Act does not provide for private enforcement. 230 The
Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934 also provides no
private cause of action, and in a 1977 case 231 the Supreme Court
labeled this a factor that weighed heavily in its decision not to
permit a private action under the 1934 Act. These precedents
make it extremely doubtful that
a court will permit a private
23 2
right of action under the Rule.

225. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,971 (1979):
The existence of such a right is necessary to protect the members of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted and the rule is being
promulgated, is consistent with the legislative intent of the Congress in
enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and is necessary to the enforcement scheme established by the Congress in that
Act and to the Commission's own enforcement efforts.
226. FTC letter of Dec. 21, 1978 (Questions &Answers).
227. Id.
228. 377 U.S. 426 (1963).
229. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (holding that a
private remedy is not implicit in a statute which does not expressly provide

one).

230. At least one commentator has noted that "[i in the absence of special enabling legislation, there will be no direct private enforcement of the
new FTC trade regulation on disclosure to prospective franchisees." H.

BROWN, supra note 35, at 180.
231. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that

breaches of fiduciary duty, which would give rise to a private cause of ac-

tion, were not actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
232. While the Supreme Court has not ruled on a private right of action
under the FTC Act, a line of lower court cases has held that there is no
private right. See, e.g., Fisher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,
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The Rule in Perspective
More than nine years have elapsed since the FrC began the
proceedings which ultimately resulted in promulgation of the
Franchise Rule. Over seven years have passed since the FTC first
proposed the Rule. More than four years have passed since the
FTC claimed to have completed taking evidence on which
it now
23 3
purports to have relied in promulgating the final Rule.
In response to a suggestion that "consistent with this
liesurely [sic] approach" 234 the FTC should postpone the Rule's
effective date, the Commission responded that "the period after
the public comment ended was spent.. . in a careful evaluation
of the material ... in the administrative record [and] preparation of the statement of basis and purpose .... ,"235 The FTC
claimed that "[f] ar from being an indication of indifference, this
lengthy review process reveals the Commission's concern for
promulgating a well-reasoned and fair rule. '236 Whatever the
motivation for the delay, one of the consequences is that fourteen states enacted disclosure laws in the meantime, and it is
now necessary to deal with questions of preemption and use of
the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular which could have been
237
avoided by more timely federal action.
Most of the problems likely to result from the Rule have
been discussed above. The FTC's broad definition of franchise,
which lumps together "package and product franchises," 238 has
generated the most opposition from selective distribution organizations. At this writing, their arguments appear to have prevailed. Some selective distribution companies have received
FTC staff advisory opinions that they are not franchisors because they charge no franchise fees, 239 and other similar organizations will probably escape coverage on the same ground.
However, a great deal of confusion as to the scope of coverage
240
remains.
1979-1 CCH Trade Cases 62,514, at 76,987 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1979); Carlson
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973).
233. Oil Co. Reply, supra note 155, at 2.
234. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 29.
235. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 18 n. 14.
236. Id.
237. See notes 202 &203 and accompanying text supra.
238. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(1)(i) & (a)(2) (1980). See notes 107 & 108 and
accompanying text supra.
239. See notes 126-29 and accompanying text supra.
240. See text accompanying notes 98, 144-46 supra.
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Federal/state jurisdictional questions are of concern to
those states that already have disclosure laws. 24 1 Extra costs
are an obvious problem for franchisors. 242 "The Commission apparently relies upon the ability of manufacturers to pass onto
[sic] the consuming public the expense of unnecessary and burdensome regulation, since these expenses are unrecoverable.
This argument is not worthy of a regulatory agency charged with
achieving fairness in the marketplace and protecting the consumer."24 3 Finally, the tendency of the Rule to reduce competition through its disproportionately heavy impact on new
franchisors is a concern to consumers as well as to the parties to
244
franchise agreements.
Franchisors have claimed that the prohibition against including information in the disclosure document which is not required by the Commission 245 "may violate the First Amendment
rights of both potential franchisees and franchisors by forcing
participation in speech which does not reflect their opinion[s]
and [is] against their will[s]. ' ' 246 The FTC responds that
franchisors "are free to distribute any information they choose
in addition to the information required ... provided ... [it] is
not inconsistent with the information contained in the ... dis'247
closure document.
Another requirement in the Rule that causes trouble is disclosure of indictments of directors, even when the indictment
was dropped, the case was settled, the person was found not
guilty, or the indictment is not yet resolved. 248 "The Commission is taking the attitude that an accusation is the same as a
241. See San Francisco comment, supra note 105. See also notes 199-204
and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 220-24 and accompanying text supra.
243. MVMA Motion to File Reply, supra note 112, at 9.
244. The Securities and Exchange Commission over the years has
eliminated the competition in the securities market, making it almost
impossible for the small and medium size companies to finance,
thereby forcing mergers vertically and horizontally. They have done all
this for the "benefit of the consumer." The FTC in its zeal to get into
the franchising act is following in the footsteps of its sister, the SEC.
Neither will help the consumer.
FRANCHISE REVIEW, supra note 107, at 11.
245. "e. Certain Prohibitions. [N]o information may appear in the disclosure document unless it is required either by the rule or by non-preempted state law." 44 Fed. Reg. 49,971 (1979).
246. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 75.
"The Commission is in effect saying: 'You may speak only as we say
you may speak, or you may not speak at all.'" MVMA Motion to File Reply,
supra note 112, at 10.
247. FTC Opposition Motion, supra note 6, at 16.
248. 44 Fed. Reg. 49,973 (1979).
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conviction. '249 The obligation to report pretrial settlements
"will severely retard a company's willingness to settle what it
considers to be unmeritorious cases.

'250

And the Rule's require-

with those
ments on disclosure of indictments are inconsistent
25 1
of the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular.
CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the goal of the Rule to prevent fraud
in franchising by requiring that prospective franchisees be given
the information necessary to make an informed decision is commendable. 252 But while "in theory the Rule is proper,.

. .

there

is a vast difference between theory and practicality. '25 3 Along
with the Rule, the FTC promulgated a lengthy statement of basis and purpose, and unprecedented Guides for application of
the Rule. 2 54 The length of these documents, and the apparent

disagreement as to coverage between the Rule and the
Guides, 25 5 have produced doubt in some businesses about
256
whether they must comply with the Rule's requirements.
One businessman expressed his frustration with the scope of
coverage to the Senate Small Business Committee: "It is like
trying to develop a safety standard to cover both a tricycle and a
double bottom semi, because they're both vehicles.

'257

Such problems may force a franchisor to seek professional
help to determine whether, and how, to comply with the Rule.
In addition, the Rule requires the franchisor to recommend on
the cover of the disclosure statement that the franchisee consult
249. FRANCHISE REVIEW, supra note 107, at 11.
250. Oil Co. Motion, supra note 97, at 23 n. 23.
251. 'The Statement indicates that the required settlement disclosure is
'consistent' with the UFOC. However, the UFOC only requires disclosure of
the precise terms of settlement if they were approved by a court and are a
matter of public record. . . ." IFA comment, supra note 170, at 6.
252. If franchising is to fulfill its claim as the nation's last frontier for
the small businessman, it cannot be based on fraud in any form. Profit
must be taken out of all such misrepresentation, regardless of the cost.
In fact, there is ample proof that legitimate joint ventures can be maintained in franchising without resort to such abusive tactics. Those assumptions underlie all current legislative efforts.

H. BROWN, supra note 35, at 182.
253. Mr. Hero comment, supra note 213, at 4.
254. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.

255. See text accompanying notes 166-70 supra.
256. See text accompanying notes 166-70 supra. See also notes 98 & 123
and accompanying text supra.
257. Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 12 (Frank E. Bauchiero, President,
Material Handling Group of Rexnord, Inc.).
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an advisor. 25 8 One commentator has observed that "[t] his is not
a franchise rule, it's a lawyers' and accountants' employment
act. (The FTC tells you to check with these people before investing; even the SEC doesn't do that.)" 25 9 And, "[w]ho says
that a government agency has the right to decide where or when
260
a person speculates with his money, or if he even should?"
Several comments have observed that the end result of the
Rule is to increase the costs of doing business, and ultimately
the costs of goods to the consumer, 261 with little resulting benefit to the franchisee or the public.

262

This is the kind of problem

addressed by President Carter in a March, 1979 press release announcing major reforms in the regulatory process:
Regulation has a large and increasing impact on the economy. Uncertainty about upcoming rules can reduce investment and productivity. Compliance with regulations absorbs large amounts of the
capital investments of some industries, further restricting productivity. Inflexible rules and massive paperwork generate extra costs
that are especially burdensome for small businesses, state and local governments, and non-profit
263groups. Regulations that impose
needless costs add to inflation.
Government regulations that do not se~re the public interest should be simplified or eliminated. KFC Corporation suggested that a one-sentence rule forbidding fraud might be all
258. See note 92 supra.
259. FRANCHISE REVIEW, supra note 107, at 12. See Mr. Hero comment,
supra note 213, at 3 ("[the Rule] greatly enhanced the need for, and fees of,
the accounting profession").
260. FRANCHISE REVIEW, supra note 107, at 12.

261. See notes 220-22 and accompanying text supra.
262. The most pessimistic conclusion concerning the effect of the Rule
was that "not only is the small franchisor doomed ... but the Rule is a real
threat to the American entrepreneur. The result of this Rule is that few

franchises will remain available to the public and they will only be available
to the rich." Mr. Hero comment, supra note 213, at 7.
More typical of the comments on the effect of the Rule are these:
"[T]he Rule will result in another costly, unreasonable and unnecessary
burden on American business." Winston & Strawn comment, supra note
113, cover letter at 2. "[I] n rulemaking it is important ... [to] regulate only
to correct the abuses which create such ills and not to impinge on the free
enterprise system where such abuses do not exist." Koehring comment,
supra note 23, at 2.
263. Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1979).
Since the first federal regulatory agency was established nearly a
century ago, regulatory programs have grown steadily in number,
scope, and impact. During that time, however, little attention has been
paid to the management of the regulatory process .... The time has
come to stop this neglect .... [W] e must reform the government's regulation of others' resources.
Id.
H.R. 2313, proposed FTC Improvement Legislation, would require the
FTC to submit final rules to Congress for review.

19801

FTC FranchiseDisclosure Rule

that is required to protect franchisees. 264 Since fraud is illegal
anyway, even that is probably more than necessary. In today's
economy, business needs fewer, not more, restrictions.
Mary L. Brown
Lynn R. Price

264. Letter from KFC Corp. to FTC at 6 (Nov. 19, 1974) (comment submitted regarding the Rule):
Perhaps a one-sentence rule would be all that is required to protect
franchisees. For example: "In connection with the grant of any
franchise, no franchisor shall make any false or misleading statement
of a material nature, nor omit to make any statement that is necessary
to make any statements that are made not materially false or not materially misleading."

